A trading strategy designed to exploit the information contained in the returns of alliance partners, yields economically and statistically significant returns. A long-short portfolio sorted on lagged returns of strategic alliance partners provides a return of 89 basis points per month. This result is robust to a number of specifications and is not driven by pre-existing economic links between alliance partners.
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period from 1991 through 2012. This result is robust to a number of specifications including different adjustments for risk, controlling for different proxies for cross-autocorrelations, excluding partnerships with customer-supplier relationships as well as controls for industry returns. The partner-based trading strategy profits are weaker in recent years and for partners in different industries. The results do not obtain for the largest quintile of stocks. The partner-based underreaction declines monotonically across the size quintiles and exists only for stocks that belong to size quintiles one through four.
While the returns to the partner-based trading strategy are economically large, a search for the source of these returns suggests that it is the formation of the alliance and not pre-existing economic links that lead to the high returns. The possibility of pre-existing links driving the results is suggested by the fact that the partner-based trading strategy yields returns of about 50 basis points (albeit statistically insignificant) in the three year period before the formation of the alliance. However, a difference-in-difference test reveals that relative to a sample of matched firms, return correlations between alliance partners increases after the formation of the alliance. Also, a placebo test using returns of partner matched firms, yields zero trading strategy profits. Finally, Heckman's sample selection tests suggest that the results are not being driven by a sample selection bias caused potentially by the formation of alliances among firms with existing economic links. In any case, regardless of the source of the partner-based trading strategy profits, monthly returns of 89 basis points are economically large and suggest a violation of semi-strong form efficiency.
There is a large literature on strategic alliances that examines their sources of value creation. Robinson (2008) argues that alliances are formed when it is difficult to enforce contracts internally and when companies undertake diversifying projects. Berg and Friedman (1981) suggest that alliances are created for learning and knowledge acquisition while Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006) point to co-operation in the development of new technology. Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2013) document a causal link between corporate governance and alliances, suggesting that well governed firms are more likely to form alliances. McConnell and Nantell (1985) and Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that partners experience positive stock price reactions to the announcement of the alliance and experience improved operating performance in subsequent years. This paper provides the additional dimension that a firm's stock price moves in response to that of its partners'. While Boone and Ivanov (2012) find that firms experience a negative price reaction around their partners' bankruptcy filing, we find that the partners' positive and negative returns, both, impact the firm's next month return. However, the question still remains -why is the partner-based trading strategy return not arbitraged away? 5 We argue that investor inattention may be the source of a firm's underreaction to its partners' returns. The limited attention hypothesis is tested by measuring the information load faced by investors at the announcement of the alliance. Specifically, we construct a news intensity measure each day by scaling the daily number of alliance announcements by the previous calendar year's daily average. High news intensity implies higher investor inattention. Consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, the announcement returns are significantly lower for alliances announced on the high news intensity days than for alliances announced on the low intensity days. Further, the monthly partnerbased trading strategy return is 0.60% for alliances with announcements on low news intensity days and 1.08% among deals with announcements on high news intensity days and the difference in longshort portfolio returns between the high and the low news intensity groups is a significant 0.48% per month.
Finally, we find that proxies for limits to arbitrage also impact the profitability of the partnerbased trading strategy. The long-short portfolio returns are significantly stronger for illiquid stocks and for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, high institutional ownership, low price and low analyst following. For instance, the difference in the long-short portfolio returns between the illiquid and liquid stocks is 115 basis points and between the high and low idiosyncratic portfolios it is 100 basis points per month.
Thus, investor inattention and limits to arbitrage may be the reasons behind the profitability of the partner-based trading strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. Section II presents the results and Section III presents the robustness tests. Section IV discriminates between existing economic links and alliance formation as the source of the partner-based trading returns.
Section V presents evidence of limits of arbitrage and Section VI presents evidence of limited investor attention. Section VII concludes.
I. Data

A. Alliance Data and Firm-Partner Links
Our sample of alliances is from the Securities Data Company (SDC) platinum database. We include all alliances including joint ventures and those that are not joint ventures. We retain deals which involve at least two U.S. public companies traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We then match the alliance data with all stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We use SDC's 6-digit historical CUSIP (NCUSIP) to match with the CRSP common stocks 8-digit NCUSIP, at the time of deal announcements. If a company has multiple common shares, we retain the common share 6 with the largest market cap on the deal announcement dates. There are 7,471 deals available including 1,334 joint ventures and 6,137 non-joint ventures during the period between 1985 and 2012. While 94% of deals in our merged sample contain exactly two CRSP stocks, the maximum number of CRSP stocks covered in a deal is 14. Table I lists the alliance deals by year. Given that there are so few deals at the start of the sample, our analysis will include data from 1991 through 2012. The alliance deals are populated in the 1990s, with a peak of 799 deals in 1999, and decrease dramatically in the 2000s. The average number of deals per year is 267. Among all deals, 18% are joint ventures and 34% have all participants from the same industry. The 48 industry definitions are based on SIC codes and are obtained from Ken French's website. 5 Firms in a deal are considered partners. We impose a one-month gap between the deal announcement month and stock returns in order to allow the partnership relation to be known before the returns they are supposed to explain. For example, Nike and Apple announced an alliance on May 23, 2006. In our sample, we match this Nike-Apple partnership to returns starting at the end of July 2006. Only 2.07% of deals (7.15% for joint ventures and 0.93% for non-joint ventures) have deal termination dates available. For deals with valid termination dates, the partnership lasts till the deal termination month. For deals with missing termination dates, we assume the partnership lasts for five years from the month of deal announcements. For robustness, we also assume that the partnership lasts for either three years or until December 2012, which is the end of our sample period. In any given month, a stock is linked to its partner(s) if that month is within the duration of the partnership. A firm could have multiple partners, either from the same deal, or from different deals. If a company has been defined as a partner from multiple deals, we still count it only once.
B. Return Tests Sample and Partner Return
We focus the analysis on common socks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). To avoid extremely illiquid stocks, we exclude stocks with a closing price at the end of the previous month below one dollar. 6 The monthly returns of common risk factors and risk-free rate are taken from Ken French's website. We also obtain stock price, trading volume and shares outstanding from CRSP. Annual accounting variables, quarterly earnings reports, and the principal customer information are obtained from Compustat. We obtain analyst coverage and earnings forecasts data from I/B/E/S. The quarterly institutional holding data are from Thomson Reuters (13F) database.
7 Table II reports the summary statistics for our final sample over 264 months from January 1991 through December 2012. The sample size varies with the type of the deal and the duration of the partnership. In our baseline specification "All deals valid for 5 years", we use all alliance deals and assume that the partnership would last for five years unless otherwise specified in the data. There are 232,640 stock-month observations. Over the entire 264-month period, the average number of stocks per month is 881, with a minimum of 304 and a maximum of 1,537. On average, stocks with firmpartner links in our sample comprise 50.4% of the total market capitalization and 11.5% of the total number of stocks in the CRSP universe.
Panel B of Table II shows that the average size percentile is 0.69 and the average book-tomarket ratio percentile is 0.36. 7 Hence, relative to the CRSP universe, these stocks are big (especially for joint ventures related firms), growth stocks. It could be that growth firms have more incentives to form alliances, and big firms have ability to negotiate and implement it. On average, a stock per month is linked to 2.87 partners, while the median number is one.
The alternative samples are similar. The total stock-month observations increase by 35% in the setting "All deals valid till 2012", and decrease by 20% in another setting "All deals valid for 3 years".
In both alternative settings, the distributions of size and book-to-market ratio are close to the baseline specification. Besides using all alliance deals, we also consider joint ventures only and non-joint ventures subsamples. The joint ventures sample covers fewer and bigger stocks than those covered by non-joint ventures sample.
Since, in any month, some firms could be linked to multiple partners, we construct an equalweighted portfolio of all partners and rebalance these portfolios every calendar month as the partners change over time. Following Cohen and Frazzini (2008) , we designate the monthly return of this portfolio as the partner return and use the monthly partner return as a proxy for news about partners.
For most of this paper, we form calendar time portfolio by sorting stocks on their previous month's equal-weighted partner return, EWPRet t-1 .
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More specifically, at the beginning of month t, we rank all stocks based on their partner return in month t-1 and assign them to five quintile portfolios. The portfolios are then rebalanced every calendar month.
II. Results
A. Portfolio Sorts
7 The size and book-to-market percentiles are defined using full CRSP sample. 8 Our results are robust to using last month's value-weighted partner return, VWPRet t-1 8 Table III provides the basic results of this paper. Panel A focuses on our baseline specification "All deals valid for 5 years" to sort stocks into quintiles based on their equal-weighted partner return of month t-1, EWPRet t-1 . Both equal-weighted and value-weighted returns in month t of each quintile portfolio are reported. The column "5-1" shows the returns of a zero-cost long-short portfolio that holds the top 20% high partner return stocks and sell shorts the bottom 20% low partner return stocks.
We will refer to this strategy as "partner-based strategy" and the corresponding long-short portfolio as "partner-based long-short portfolio". To be included in the portfolios, stocks must have a non-missing partner return in month t-1 and a non-missing closing price at the end of the previous month that is greater than one dollar.
Panel A shows that the raw returns of equal-weighted portfolios increase monotonically from the low partner return quintile to high partner return quintile. A partner-based long-short portfolio that is long the top 20% stocks with high partner returns and short the bottom 20% stocks with low partner returns, delivers a monthly return of 0.89% (t-statistic=4.51), or an annualized return of 19.58%.
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This partner-based trading strategy generates a Sharpe ratio of 0.25. Controlling for common risk factors leaves the magnitude and significance of the long-short portfolio return largely unchanged. All the alphas increase monotonically from quintile 1 to quintile 5. The difference in CAPM alpha between the highest and lowest partner return quintile is slightly higher at 0.94% (t-statistic=4.99). Similarly, the difference in Fama-French three-factor alpha is 0.95% (t-statistic=4.75). The Carhart (1997) fourfactor alpha is 0.84% (t-statistic=4.77). The results remain unchanged when, in unreported tests, we use a five-factor model by including the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Hence, the return predictability cannot be explained by the exposures to common risk factors including the Fama and French (1993) factors, the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) , and the liquidity factor by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . As suggested by Daniel and Titman (1997) , firm characteristics rather than risk loadings may provide better explanatory power for expected returns. Thus, we follow Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) to adjust stock returns from the characteristics matched benchmark portfolio returns.
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The DGTW alpha decreases to 0.65% but still highly significant (tstatistic=4.02). Therefore, this partner-based return predictability is different from existing anomalies such as the size effect, the value premium, and the momentum effect. It may come from the underlying economic interactions among alliance partners, and due to investors' under-reaction to such information. 9 To adjust for serial correlation, in this paper we report robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics for both portfolio return analysis and Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression coefficients. The lag length for the Newey-West (1987) estimator is set as the integer of the 4 th root of total number of time periods used in each test. 10 These 5x5x5 125 benchmark portfolios are rebalanced each June based on market equity (NYSE breakpoints), industry-adjusted bookto-market ratio, and past one year return.
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The right hand side of Panel A of Table III shows that the results do not hold for valueweighted returns. The raw return and alphas no longer vary systematically across the partner return quintiles. The return spread and alphas from the zero-cost long-short portfolio are not significantly different from zero. This suggests that the return predictability of partner-based strategy is mainly driven by micro capitalization or extremely illiquid stocks. To explore this issue, we sort stocks on firm size and lagged partner returns. Specifically, we first rank stocks into size quintiles by market capitalization at the end of last month and then within each size quintile we further sort stocks on month t-1 partner return (EWPRet t-1 ) into quintiles. All 25 portfolios are rebalanced each month.
Panel B of Table III shows that conditioning on firm size eliminates most of the discrepancy between equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns. Both equal-weighted and valueweighted (5-1) return spreads become statistically and economically significant among size quintile 1 through 4. Not surprisingly, the partner-based trading strategy is more profitable amongst the smaller stocks. The strategy is not profitable for size quintile 5. The quintile 5 stocks, on average, rank at the 98 th percentile in terms of size relative to the CRSP universe which is not surprising given that our sample consists of big, growth firms. Overall, the partner-based strategy works well for all but the top 20% big stocks in our sample. These top 20% of stocks comprise 88% of the sample in terms of market capitalization. Thus, as is the case with most anomalies, 11 our results are generated by 80% of the sample stocks which comprise 12% of the sample in terms of market capitalization. In the rest of the paper, rather than dropping the largest 20% of the sample firms, we will focus on the equally-weighted results.
B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Our empirical methodology follows Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) . This methodology regresses individual firm risk-adjusted returns on firm level characteristics. Under the null of exact pricing, the premiums on these characteristics should be statistically and economically insignificant.
The use of individual stocks as test assets avoids the possibility that tests may be sensitive to the portfolio grouping procedure and with more dispersion in the independent variables, it allows for more precise estimates of the premiums. The risk adjusted returns, * are obtained as follows: 
where Z imt represents the lagged value of characteristic m for stock i at time t, with M being the total number of characteristics. This methodology ensures unbiased estimates of the coefficients, c mt , without the need to form portfolios because the errors in the estimation of the betas are included in the dependent variable in regression (2). The Fama-MacBeth (1973) (FM) coefficient estimates are the time-series averages of the regression coefficients, ĉ mt .
The firm characteristics include firm size as measured by the log of the market capitalization in the end of last month (LnME), 13 the log of the book-to-market ratio (Ln(BE/ME)), the firm's own last month return (Ret t-1 ) for short-term reversal effect (Jegadeesh (1990)), and firm's own past sevenmonth return not including the last month return (Ret (t-7, t-2) ) for price momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) ).
14 The independent variables of interest are the equal-weighted partner return of last month (EWPRet t-1 ), the value-weighted partner return of last month (VWPRet t-1 ), and the equalweighted partner return of past six months (EWPRet (t-6, t-1) ). To avoid the impact of extreme outliers, all independent variables are winsorized each month at 0.5% level. We report the time-series averages of cross-sectional regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics using the Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Fama and French (1992) and Avramov and Chordia (2006) have found that using the entire time series to estimate betas gives the same results as using rolling regressions using past data. We also find that our results are essentially the same when we use rolling regressions to estimate the betas and when we use raw or excess returns instead of risk adjusted returns. 13 We also use market capitalization in the end of last June (Fama and French (1992) ) and the results are essentially the same. 14 Following Fama and French (1992), we define Book-to-market (BE/ME) as the fiscal year-end book value of common equity divided by the calendar year-end market value of equity. 15 The time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of EWPRet t-1 is 0.13.
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estimate on EWPRet (t-6, t-1) of 0.55% suggests that the last month's partner return is more informative than other lags of the past six month returns. As shown in model (6) -(9), the effect of EWPRet t-1 is significant and consistent when using other definitions of the sample period for the alliances and for joint ventures and non-joint ventures.
Since stocks with available linked partners in our study comprise about 11.5% of the total number of stocks in the CRSP universe, in Panel B of The premium on firm size is negative albeit only marginally significant in some instances, which is not surprising given our 1991-2012 sample period. The premium on the book-to-market ratio is significantly positive and that on the lagged one month return is significantly negative. The coefficient on Ret (t-7,t-2) is positive but insignificant.
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However, once we exclude low-priced stocks (price<$5), the coefficient of Ret (t-7,t-2) in unreported tests becomes significantly positive, consistent with the price momentum effect.
We know that earnings surprises impact returns. Could it be that earnings surprises of a firm and its partner are correlated? In Panel C of The coefficient estimate of ID*EWPRet t-1 is significantly positive. In model (2), we add firm's own SUE as well as the partner's average SUE. The coefficient on SUE is positive and significant at the 5% level, while partner's SUE has no effect on firm's future return. Note that the coefficient estimate on ID*EWPRet t-1 is actually larger when SUE is included, although it is not-statistically different, suggesting that the impact of the lagged partner return on a firm's return is unrelated to either the partner's or the firm's most recent earnings surprise. In model (3), we add firm's own CAR(-2,2) and partner's average CAR(-2,2). The coefficient of firm's own CAR is positive and significant at 1%
level. Partner's CAR also has a positive sign but is significant only at 10% level. In both models, the coefficient on ID*EWPRet t-1 is largely unaffected. The partner's last month return predicts stock return much better than its last quarter earnings surprise. Overall, the firm's or the partner's earnings surprise cannot explain returns to our partner-based strategy.
We now investigate whether the return predictability from the partner-based strategy is driven by the slow diffusion of the partner's bad news or good news. Boone and Ivanov (2012) have documented a negative stock price reaction around a partner's bankruptcy announcement and the concern is that the partner-based trading strategy returns are being generated by financial distress amongst the partner firms. To explore this issue, we replace EWPRet t-1 with EWPRet t-1 {+} and EWPRet t-1 {-}, where EWPRet t-1 {+}= max{EWPRet t-1 , 0} and EWPRet t-1 {-}= min{EWPRet t-1 , 0}. By design, EWPRet t-1 {+} captures good news about a partner while EWPRet t-1 {-} captures the partner's bad news. Panel D of Table IV presents the results for stocks with available linked partners. When used separately with other controls in models (1) and (2), both EWPRet t-1 {+} and EWPRet t-1 {-} have strong positive impact suggesting that for firms whose partners have good (bad) news, the better (worse) the good (bad) news, the higher (lower) the stock returns. When put together in model (3), the effects of EWPRet t-1 {+} and EWPRet t-1 {-} have similar magnitudes both economically and statistically. The coefficient on EWPRet t-1 {-} is 2.44 (t-statistic=2.47) and that on EWPRet t-1 {+} is slightly lower at 1.95 (t-statistic=2.40). The difference between the two coefficient estimates is not significant. We can conclude that the return to the partner-based strategy comes from the information diffusion of the partner's bad news as well as the good news.
In sum, the portfolio results as well as the Fama-MacBeth regressions provide support for the profitability of the partner-based trading strategy.
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III. Robustness Tests
A. Alternative Samples and Alternative Partner Return Horizons
We now examine the robustness of the results based on alternative sample settings and for different firm and partner characteristics. Panel A of Table V presents It is clear that our key finding, the return predictability of partner-based strategy, is robust to the choice of different samples and also after excluding price<$5 stocks. None of these results can be explained by Fama and French (1993) three factor model or by adjusting for firm characteristics. The main finding of the profitability of the partner-based trading strategy is not restricted to the specific assumption of partnership duration, or the specific type of strategic alliances.
One concern is that the partner-based trading strategy is picking up the impact of crossautocorrelations in stock returns. Previous papers find that larger firms or firms with higher levels of trading volume, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, lead smaller firms or firms with lower levels of trading volume, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage.
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To ensure that the partnerbased strategy is not being driven by the lead-lag effect, we drop all links in which at the time of portfolio formation, the firm is smaller, has lower turnover or institutional ownership, or is covered by fewer analysts than its partners. 21 As shown in Panel B of Table V , after applying these filters the return predictability is still significant although the point estimates are lower. Across the four specifications, the average monthly three-factor alpha ranges from 0.53% to 0.72% per month suggesting that the results are unlikely to be driven by lead-lag effects.
We now examine the impact of industry affiliation on the partner-based trading strategy returns.
Since 34% of deals in the sample have all participants from the same industry, we ask whether our results depend on whether the firm-partner links are from the same industry or from different industries.
Panel B of Table V shows that the (5-1) raw returns, Fama-French alphas and the DGTW alphas are all 19 Dropping stocks with price<$5 decreases the total stock-month observations by 18%. 20 See Lo and MacKinlay (1990 ), Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993 ), Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995 and Chordia and Swaminanthan (2000) . 21 Market value (ME) is defined in the end of previous month. Turnover (TURN) is the monthly turnover in the previous month and defined as volume divided by total shares outstanding. Institutional ownership (IO) is the percentage of common stocks owned by institutions in the previous quarter. Analyst coverage (NUMEST) is the number of analysts following the firm in the previous month.
less than half when the firm and its partners are from different industries than when they are from the same industry. For instance, the average monthly three-factor alpha is 1.20% for firms with partners from the same industry, and 0.58% for firms with partners from different industries. Both alphas are highly significant. This suggests that firms have a stronger connection with partners from the same industry. In later tests, we will control for the industry returns.
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) document return predictability (customer-based trading strategy)
between the firm (supplier) and its principal customers by studying the customer-supplier links. It may be the case that we are picking up strategic alliances between suppliers and customers. To ensure that our results are not driven by the customer-supplier alliance, we follow Cohen and Frazzini (2008) to construct the customer-supplier links for all CRSP stocks and exclude from our firm-partner links those partners that are also a firm's principal customers.
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Since only 0.9% of firm-partner links overlap with the supplier-customer links reducing our total stock-month observations by 5%, our results are largely unaffected. The monthly three-factor alpha is 0.96% (t-statistic=4.90) compared with the alpha of 0.95% (t-statistic=4.75) in the basic results. Therefore, the return predictability of partner-based strategy in this study is unlikely to be caused by the customer-supplier relationship as documented by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) .
In order to test whether the partner-based trading strategy has been stable over time, we split Skipping a week between portfolio formation and investment has little effect on the partner based trading portfolio. We have also checked that upon conditioning on the partners' return in month t-2, 22 We obtain a firm's principal customers data from Compustat segment files. 23 We have checked that this decline is not being driven by the recent crisis by eliminating the NBER defined recessionary period, December 2007 to June 2009, from the sample. 24 See Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, Tong (2013) .
15 the (5-1) raw return spread is 0.36% (t-statistic=1.80) suggesting that the impact of the partners' return lasts for more than a month. However, using the partners' past six month cumulative returns offers no superior performance than the partners' last month return. We also examine the impact of the partners' past one year cumulative return while skipping last month between the formation and the investment month. The monthly three-factor alpha is 0.74% (t-statistic=2.89) suggesting that a firm's stock price reacts to news about its partners and continues to drift in the same direction.
Overall, the partner-based trading strategy profits are robust to the lead-lag effect in stock returns, to supplier-customer relationships and to different formation periods. We do find that the profitability of the partner-based trading strategy has declined in recent years.
B. The Role of Industry
Panel A of Table I documents that about a third of the deals in our sample have all participants from the same industry. Moreover, the return spread of the partner-based strategy is larger when the firmpartner links are from the same industry (Panel B of Table V) . Therefore, in this subsection we further examine how the potential effects of industry could affect our main findings.
It may be the case that the partner-based trading effect merely reflects the cross-industry or intra-industry momentum. The former refers to a momentum strategy executed at the industry level, especially among upstream and downstream industries (Menzly and Ozbas (2006, 2010) ), whereas the latter may reflect the performance of individual stocks relative to their industry average (Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) ). Although Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that most of the profits from momentum strategies come from cross-industry momentum rather than intra-industry momentum, Asness, Porter, and Stevens (2000) find that intra-industry momentum effect exists even after controlling for cross-industry momentum. Hou (2007) further finds that the lead-lag effect is predominantly an intra-industry phenomenon: returns on big firms lead returns on small firms only within the same industry.
We rerun the Fama-MacBeth regressions in Panel A of Table IV after controlling for the industry returns. Specifically, we control for intra-industry momentum by using lagged returns of the firm's own equal-weighted industry portfolio as an independent variable in the monthly cross-sectional regressions. We also use the average lagged returns of the partners' equal-weighted industry portfolio to control for the possibility that our main results are being generated by the cross-industry momentum.
The first regression in Table VI shows that the own industry lagged return does impact the firm's risk adjusted return. Moreover, the coefficient on EWPRet t-1 also declines from 2.004 in Table IV to 1.891 although the difference is not-statistically significant. The partner's industry return also impacts the 16 firm's risk adjusted return and it also causes the coefficient on EWPRet t-1 to decline from 2.004 to 1.606. Including, the firm and the partner industry returns results in a further decline of the coefficient on EWPRet t-1 to 1.569. In any case, the coefficients on EWPRet t-1 are all significant at the 1% level and are not-statistically different from the 2.004 in Table IV . Thus, the firm's lagged industry return as well as the partner's lagged industry return both impact the firm's risk adjusted return but the impact of the partners' lagged return remains statistically and economically significant.
We further control for the intra-industry as well as the cross-industry lead-lag effect by using the firm's and the partner's industry size-sorted portfolios. Following Hou (2007), at the end of each June, we sort all firms in each of the Fama-French twelve industries into three size portfolios based on 30% and 70% breakpoints. 25 We then use the lagged equal-weighted returns of the small, medium, and large industry portfolios of both the firm and its partners. If a firm has more than one linked partner, we calculate the equal-weighted average across partners for partners' size sorted industry portfolio returns. Other control variables include firm's size, book-to-market ratio, firm's own last month return, and firm's own past six-month return from t-7 to t-2. Regressions (4)- (6) in Table VI confirm a strong (weak) impact of the own (cross) industry lead-lag effects. The impact of own industry lagged returns increases monotonically with size. The coefficient on the lagged partner industry return is also significant for the largest industry portfolio. However, none of these industry effects explain the partner-based trading strategy returns since the coefficient on last month's partner return (EWPRet t-1 )
is significantly positive across all the models.
IV. Existing Economic Linkage or Alliance Formation?
The return to the long-short quintile portfolio formed by sorting on partner returns is an economically and statistically significant 89 basis points per month. Moreover, the partner-based trading strategy returns are robust to the many different specifications we have examined. In this section, we ask the following question. Is it the formation of the alliance that leads to the increased predictability of a firm's returns based on the partner's returns or is it the case that the alliances are formed between firms that are already economically linked.
If the return predictability of this partner-based strategy is caused by economic interactions that arise due to the formation of an alliance, then we would expect that such return predictability does not exist or is weak before the alliances are formed. We test this hypothesis, by examining the partnerbased trading strategy returns over the three years prior (i.e., over months t-36 to t-1) to the formation of the alliance. The results are shown in Panel A of Table VII . 25 We also use Fama-French 48 industry rather than 12 industry and the results are essentially the same.
Both raw return and DGTW (1997) characteristics-adjusted return are weaker than in Panel A of Table III . For instance, the (5-1) return spread for raw returns (DGTW adjusted returns) has declined from a monthly return of 0.89% (0.65%) to 0.50% (0.49%) with a t-statistic of 1.56 (1.57).
The positive return spread suggests that some alliance deal participants might have had economic links before they form the alliance, while for others the economic interactions might arise after the formation of the alliance. We now examine this in more detail.
In order to ascertain whether the alliance partners already had economic linkages or whether the economic linkages were created by the formation of the alliance we examine correlations before and after the formation of the alliance. The correlations are computed using three years of data before and after the formation of the alliance; the alliance announcement month is excluded. We focus our analysis on alliance deals with exactly two firms. Each firm in these deals is matched to another firm that is similar in size, book-to-market ratio and is in the same industry. We use 5x5 size and book-tomarket ratio and the Fama-French 48-industry classifications to define the matching group and a matching firm is randomly picked from this matching group. Thus, for each deal, we have a pair of real participants and a pair of matched firms. Panel B reports the correlations of monthly returns and quarterly sales growth between the two firms in the alliance and between the two matched firms.
The pre-alliance correlation in returns for the alliance firms at 0.251 is higher than the 0.209 for the matched firms suggesting a pre-alliance economic link between the alliance partners. Moreover, this return correlation between alliance firms declines to 0.243 after the formation of the alliance.
However, the return correlation between the matching firms declines even more to 0.188 and the difference-in-difference test suggests that, in relative terms, the return correlations between the alliance partners has increased after the formation of the alliance. That return correlations have generally declined is not surprising given the increase in idiosyncratic volatility documented by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) . Thus, the matching firm analysis and the difference-in-difference tests are important in teasing out the change in correlations from before to after the formation of the alliance.
The pre-alliance correlation in quarterly sales growth for the alliance firms at 0.142 is higher than the 0.093 for the matched firms suggesting a pre-alliance economic link between the alliance partners. The quarterly sales growth correlation between the alliance firms increases to 0.167 after the formation of the alliance. However, the sales growth correlation between the matching firms also increases and the difference-in-difference tests does not find any significant increase in the sales growth correlation between the alliance firms.
Overall, while the pre-alliance correlations in returns and sales growth point to existing economic links between the alliance firms, the increase in post-alliance return and sales growth 18 correlations (although the increase in sales growth correlation is not statistically significant) suggests that the formation of alliances leads to increases in economic linkages.
The question that arises is this. Does the return predictability documented in Table III arise due to the pre-existing economic links or is it due to links created by the formation of the alliance? The placebo test we conduct next seeks to answer this question. The test replaces the partner firm with a matching firm that is also the best match in terms of the pre-alliance return correlation. Specifically, for a given firm, each partner is matched to a group of firms based on a combination of size, book-tomarket ratio, and industry. Then, one stock within the matched group is identified as partner's matched stock if its pre-alliance return correlation with the firm is the closest to the pre-alliance return correlation between the partner and the firm. Panel C repeats the equally weighted analysis of Panel A of Table III .
When the matching group is constructed using the 5x5 size and book-to-market sorts, the (5-1) raw return spread is an insignificant 0.08% per month. When the matching group is constructed using 5x5 size and book-to-market and the Fama-French twelve industry groups, 26 the (5-1) monthly raw return spread is still an insignificant 0.21%. These insignificant return spreads suggest that the prealliance return correlation does not cause our return predictability. The partner-based trading strategy returns seem to obtain due to economic linkages created by the strategic alliances.
We now repeat the FM regressions of Panel A of Table IV to test whether the pre-alliance return correlations impact the risk-adjusted returns computed as in equation (1). If the partner-based return predictability is due to a pre-alliance economic linkage, then the effect of the partners' past return should be stronger when the pre-alliance return correlation between firm and partner is higher. because of the requirement that enough data be available from three years prior to the announcement of the deal in order to be able to compute the pre-alliance correlations. The results in columns (2) and (3) show that the pre-alliance correlations do not impact the risk-adjusted firm returns. The FM coefficients on the interaction terms between partners' lagged return and the correlations are also not different from zero. The coefficient estimate on EWPRet t-1 declines from 1.97 to 1.59 when Corr
) along with its interaction with EWPRet t-1 is included in the monthly cross-sectional 26 The results are robust to using the Fama-French 48 industry groups.
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regressions. However, this decline is not statistically significant and the FM coefficient estimate on EWPRet t-1 remains significant. In sum, the pre-alliance return correlations between the partner firms do not impact the risk-adjusted firm returns.
The results in Table VII suggest that while there are pre-alliance economic links between firms that enter into strategic alliances, the pre-alliance return correlations do not impact the risk adjusted returns. Moreover, the return correlations increase after the formation of the alliance pointing to an increase in post-alliance economic links. Since, the alliance sample may be non-random we now conduct Heckman's sample selection tests to formally check whether the sample selection bias impacts the results.
We focus on alliance deals with exactly two firms and a randomly matched pair. The matching is done as in Panel B of Table VII . The deal event dummy equals 1 for the alliance pair and 0 for the matched pair. For variables affecting the decision to form the alliance, we consider for each firm in the pair the sales of firm relative to the total sales of industry, R&D expenditures as a fraction of total assets, and the return correlation amongst two firms in the pair over three years before the deal announcement.
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The idea is that firms with high R&D expenses and a large fraction of industry sales are more likely to be those with more opportunities and are more likely to form alliances. Also, firms with higher pre-alliance return correlations are more likely to have existing economic links and are more likely to form alliances. We now ask the following question. What is it that sustains the profitability of the partnerbased trading strategy?
V. Limits to Arbitrage
Cognitive psychological biases and limits to arbitrage are two building blocks of behavioral finance (see the survey by Barberis and Thaler (2003)). In a frictionless market, sophisticated investors should fully arbitrage away predictable returns due to mispricing. However, mispricing may not disappear completely because of limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). If the partner-based strategy returns reflect some type of mispricing, then we should expect that these returns are more pronounced among stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage. We already know from Table III , that the partnerbased trading strategy profits are more prevalent amongst the smaller stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage. In our next set of tests we directly use the proxies for limits to arbitrage that are prevalent in the literature.
We use independent double sorts to examine how the profits from the partner-based strategy depend on proxies for limits to arbitrage. These proxies are motivated by measures of holding costs, transaction costs, illiquidity, short-sale constraints, and information uncertainty. Idiosyncratic risk is the most common proxy for holding costs (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Pontiff (2006)).
Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), we measure idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the residuals of the Fama-French three-factor model estimated using the daily stock returns over the previous month.
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We use stock price level at the end of the previous month to proxy for transaction costs, since stocks with lower price tend to have higher percentage bid-ask spreads. We also use the previous month's illiquidity as defined by Amihud (2002) . Following Nagel (2005), the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of the most recent quarter is a proxy for short-sale constraints. Information uncertainty is a risk that arbitrageurs are uncertain about the true fundamental value of their arbitrage positions. Following Zhang (2006), we proxy for information uncertainty using analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts following the firm in the previous month.
Each month, stocks are independently sorted on the partners' past return into quintiles, and sorted on each arbitrage cost measure into three groups. Table IX reports the (5-1) long-short partnerbased portfolio returns in each of the three arbitrage cost sorted portfolios. Consistent with the limits 28 Our results are not sensitive to the specific measure of idiosyncratic volatility.
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to arbitrage hypothesis, the magnitude of the partner-based long-short portfolio returns increase monotonically with idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity, and decrease monotonically with institutional ownership, price level, and analyst coverage. Furthermore, the difference in the partnerbased long-short trading profits between the highest and lowest arbitrage cost groups is significant.
The difference in the long-short portfolio returns between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility portfolios is hundred basis point a month; between the high and low illiquidity portfolios it is 115 basis points a month; between the low and high institutional ownership portfolio it is 88 basis points; between low and high priced stocks it is 93 basis points and between low and high analyst coverage portfolios it is 70 basis points. In each case, the difference in the long-short portfolio returns between the high and low arbitrage cost portfolio is statistically and economically significant suggesting that mispricing amongst stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity or lower institutional ownership, price level, and analyst coverage are difficult to arbitrage.
VI. Limited Attention
While, limits to arbitrage may prevent the partner-based trading strategy returns from being eliminated, in this section we search for the source of the return predictability. One possible behavioral explanation is that investors pay limited attention to announcements of strategic alliances. Investors' ability to process announcements related to a firm and understand their economic implications could be negatively affected by extraneous news events related to other firms. If investors are fully aware of the impact of strategic alliances on returns and pay attention to the firm-partner links, then the stock price of a firm should quickly adjust to price changes of its partners' stocks. However, distraction at the time of alliance announcements could result in a lagged reaction thus inducing the return predictability.
This potential explanation is consistent with existing literature on information diffusion in the stock market driven by investors' limited attention. firms with less analyst coverage, firms with low institutional holdings could attract less investor attention and lead to stronger return predictability. 30 Unfortunately, even though these proxies could proxy for investor attention and the rate of information diffusion, they have been widely used as proxies for limits to arbitrage. For example, Merton (1987) argues that market making or arbitrage capacity may be lower in small-capitalization stocks. Analyst coverage is related to information uncertainty as well (Zhang (2006)) and institutional ownership is also a proxy for short-sale constraints (Nagel (2005)). The results in Panel B of Table III and Table IX show that the partner-based trading strategy return is higher among small, illiquid, neglected firms and firms that have low institutional holdings. However, this evidence is consistent with the predictions of both limited attention hypothesis as well as the limits to arbitrage hypothesis.
We test the limited attention hypothesis by measuring the information load faced by investors assuming that on Friday investors are distracted from work-related activities. 31 We follow these studies and construct a measure daily news intensity of strategic alliance event announcements to proxy for investor distraction as follows. Frist, we count the total number of alliance announcements on day t, using all alliance announcements obtained from the SDC database. Then, the daily number of alliance events is scaled by the previous calendar year's daily average to give us a measure of the daily news intensity.
Our first test of the investor attention hypothesis examines the alliance announcement day returns on high and low intensity days. If news intensity leads to investor inattention, then announcement day returns should be higher (lower) on the low (high) news intensity days. Panel A of (2000) look at price momentum and argue that investors spend less effort to follow small firms and firm-specific information about small firms gets out slowly. Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) find that analyst coverage influences the rate of information diffusion. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) also argue that stocks with lower analyst coverage should be ones where firm-specific information moves more slowly across the investing public. 31 We have considered using Friday announcements to proxy for inattention. However, only 693 of 7471 deals are announced on Fridays. Hence, we do not have sufficient stocks to conduct the cross-sectional tests.
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announcement of the alliance. Moreover, the CARs are higher (lower) on the low (high) news intensity days. For instance, CAR(-1,1) on the high intensity days is 1.21% while it is 1.62% on the low intensity days. The difference in the CARs is a statistically and economically significant 0.41%.
Similar results obtain for CAR(-2,2) and CAR (-3,3) suggesting that investors are indeed distracted on the high news intensity days.
Our second test of the investor attention hypothesis examines the partner-based trading strategy returns by sorting on the basis of alliance announcements on low and high news intensity days. We take the simple average of daily news intensity across deals each month for each specific firm-partner link. Since a firm could be linked with multiple partners through the same deal or different deals, we further take the simple average across partners for each firm each month to get a single monthly measure of news intensity for each firm. High news intensity implies more investor inattention. To address the concern that our news intensity could be related to other variables that affect the partnerbased trading strategy returns, we also calculate the adjusted news intensity as the cross-sectional regression residual after controlling for size, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, stock price, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage. We use news intensity as well as the adjusted news intensity to proxy for investor distraction and inattention.
We use independent double sorts to examine how the profits of the partner-based strategy depend on news intensity. Each month, stocks are independently sorted on partners' past returns into quintiles, and also sorted on the distraction measure into two groups. Panel B of Table X reports the (5-1) long-short portfolio return sorted by high and low news intensity days at the time of the announcement of the alliance. The magnitude of the partner-based trading strategy profits is much stronger among the alliance deals where investors are more likely to be distracted, i.e., among alliance deals from high news intensity days. The monthly partner-based trading strategy return is 0.60% (tstatistic=2.70) for alliance deals with announcements on low news intensity days and 1.08% (tstatistic=4.49) among deals with announcements on high news intensity days when investors are more likely to be inattentive to any given deal. The difference in long-short portfolio returns between the high and the low news intensity groups is a significant 0.48% per month. Using the adjusted news intensity to define inattention generates stronger results. The partner-based trading strategy return becomes insignificant (0.41%, t-statistic=1.33) for alliances announced on high adjusted news intensity days and highly significant (1.12%, t-statistic=4.37) for alliances announced on low adjusted news intensity days. The difference between the more and less attention groups is a significant at 0.71% per month. The results hold for two sub-periods as well as for the alternative samples.
24
In the above analysis we have assumed that investor attention persists, i.e., if investors do not pay attention to alliance announcements then even five years (or later) after the announcement, the partner-based trading strategy is profitable. But should investors not understand the alliance relationship over time? We test for this by examining the profitability of the strategy after skipping one, two and three years after the announcement. Recall that the (5-1) long-short portfolio return was 89 basis points. This long-short portfolio return remains at 89 basis points if the first year after the announcement is omitted from the analysis; the return is 72 basis points if two years are skipped; and 70 basis points if three years are omitted. If we assume that the nature of the economic link between the alliance partners does not change over time then this decline in the profitability is consistent with investors learning about the alliance relationship over time.
Overall the payoffs to the partner-based trading strategy are consistent with the hypothesis that limited investor attention drives the partner-based return predictability result. Investors have limited time and cognitive resources to process the news of strategic alliances. If more alliances are announced on a given day, investors are distracted and are more likely to neglect the associated firmpartner links.
VII. Conclusion
This paper documents an economically and statistically significant return to a partner-based trading strategy. Lagged returns of strategic alliance partners impact the return of the firm in the alliance. A long-short portfolio formed by sorting on the partners' lagged average return yields 89 basis points per month. This return is robust to a number of specifications and suggests a violation of semi-strong form of efficiency.
It is the formation of alliances and not pre-existing links between alliance partners that leads to the high returns to the partner-based trading strategy. Relative to a sample of matched firms, the return correlations between alliance partners increases after the formation of the alliance. A placebo test using returns of partner matched firms, yields zero trading strategy profits. Also, Heckman's sample selection tests suggest that the results are not being driven by a sample selection bias caused potentially by the formation of alliances among firms with existing economic links.
We provide evidence that investor inattention may be the source of a firm's underreaction to its partners' returns. Days with many (few) announcements of the formation of strategic alliances are classified as high (low) news intensity days. High (low) news intensity days imply higher (lower)
investor inattention. Consistent with the investor inattention hypothesis, the partner-based trading strategy yields a significantly higher return for alliance deals announced on high intensity days as 25 compared to those announced on low intensity days. Finally, proxies for limits of arbitrage such as institutional holding, idiosyncratic volatility, analyst following, firm price and illiquidity also strongly impact the partner-based trading strategy returns. Thus, limits to arbitrage and investor inattention may be the source of the violations of semi-strong form efficiency based on a trading strategy designed to exploit the information contained in the returns of alliance partners. There is a one-month lag between the partnership imbedded in deals and the return tests. Each stock each month is linked to a basket of partners. Stocks with price less than $1 at the end of last month are excluded. Panel A reports the number of stocks covered across time. Panel B reports the pooled summary across all stock-month observations. Percent coverage of stock universe (EW) is the number of stocks covered, divided by the total number of CRSP stocks. Percent coverage of stock universe (VW) is the total market capitalization of stock covered, divided by the total market value of the CRSP stock universe. Size is the firm's market value of equity. Book-to-market is the fiscal-yearend book value of common equity divided by the calendar-yearend market value of equity. The size and book-to-market percentiles are defined using full CRSP sample. This table reports the calendar-time abnormal returns. At the beginning of each month, all stocks are sorted into quintiles based on its partners' last month return EWPRet t-1. Panel A reports the results for both the equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns. Average return is measured in monthly percentage terms. CAPM alphas, FF-3 alphas and Carhart-4 alphas are calculated using the CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, and Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, respectively. Characteristics-adjusted returns are calculated using DGTW (1997) benchmarks. The Sharpe ratio of monthly returns is defined as portfolio excess return over the standard deviation of portfolio raw returns. Panel B reports the double sort results. Each month, stocks are first sorted on their last month market value into quintiles and then sorted within each quintile into quintiles based on its partners' last month return. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The return testing period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns for all CRSP common stocks. The dependent variable is monthly risk adjusted stock return (%) based on Fama-French 3-factor model using full 1991-2012 sample. EWPRet t-1 (VWPRet t-1 ) is the equal (value)-weighted returns of firm's partners of last month. ME is the market value in the end of previous month. Book-to-market (BE/ME) is the fiscal-yearend book value of common equity divided by the calendar-yearend market value of equity. Ret (-1, 0) is the stock return in the prior month. Ret (t-7, t-2) is the cumulative stock return from the prior 2 nd through 7 th month. ID is a dummy variable indicating that a stock has partner(s) available at that month. SUE is the most recent standardized unexpected earnings based on a rolling seasonal random walk model. CAR(-2, 2) is the cumulative abnormal return of most recent earning announcement for the event window [-2, 2] . EWP_SUE and EWP_CAR(-2, 2) are equal-weighted SUE and CAR(-2, 2) of partners, respectively. EWPRet t-1 {+} equals max{EWPRet t-1 , 0} and EWPRet t-1 {-} equals min{EWPRet t-1 , 0}. All independent variables are winsorized each month at the 0.5% level. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The sample period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) tstatistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports the monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions by controlling for the lagged return of the corresponding industry portfolio (INDRET), the lagged return of the corresponding partner industry portfolio (PINDRET), the lagged returns of the corresponding size-sorted small (P1_INDRET), medium (P2_INDRET) and large (P3_INDRET) industry portfolio, and the lagged returns of the corresponding partner size-sorted small (P1_PINDRET), medium (P2_PINDRET) and large (P3_PINDRET) industry portfolio. The size-sorted industry portfolios are defined in Hou (2007) . The dependent variable is monthly risk adjusted stock return (%) based on Fama-French 3-factor model using full 1991-2012 sample. Other independent variables are the same as defined in Table IV . All independent variables are winsorized each month at 0.5% level. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The sample period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A reports the portfolio sorting results for the firm-partner links from past three years to one month before the alliance deal announcement. Panel B reports the summary of correlations of return and fundamentals between two firms in an alliance deal and between two firms in the randomly matched pair. Each firm in an alliance deal with two U.S. public firms is randomly matched to another firm after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, and industry. Before (after) alliance correlations cover three years before (after) the alliance excluding the month of announcement. Panel C shows the monthly portfolio returns sorted on last month return of partner's matched stock. For a given firm, each partner in a specific deal is matched to a group of stocks based on a combination of size, book-to-market ratio, and industry. Only one stock within the matched group is identified as partner's matched stock if its pre-alliance return correlation with the firm is the most close to the pre-alliance return correlation between the partner and the firm. Panel D reports monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns. The dependent and independent variables are the same as defined in Table IV ) is the return correlation of two firms in a deal over the correlation of two randomly matched firms as defined in Panel B. All independent variables are winsorized each month at 0.5% level. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The sample period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (t-36, t-1) is the return correlation among two firms in a deal (and among two matched firms) over three years before the deal announcement. Panel B reports the second-stage Fama-MacBeth regressions. The dependent variable is monthly risk adjusted stock return (%) based on Fama-French 3-factor model using full 1991-2012 sample. EW_λ 1 and EW_λ 2 are the inverse mills ratios of each alliance deal event from model (1) and (2) in Panel A, respectively. The ratios are averaged across deals for each firm-partner link, and further averaged across partners for each firm per month. Other independent variables are the same as defined in Table IV . All independent variables are winsorized at 0.5% level. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The sample period is from January 1991 to December 2012. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. interactions between partners' past return and arbitrage cost measures. Each month, stocks are independently sorted on partners' past return into quintiles, and sorted on each arbitrage cost measure into three groups. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of the Fama-French 3-factor model estimated using the daily stock returns over the previous month. Illiquidity is the monthly illiquidity measure calculated following Amihud (2002) and measured at month t-1. Institutional ownership is the percentage of common stocks owned by institutions in the previous quarter. Price is the closing price at the end of month t-1. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following the firm in the previous month. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The return testing period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports the interactions between partners' past return and the news intensity of deal announcement days. On each alliance deal announcement day, the news intensity is measured as the total number of alliance events divided by previous one calendar year's daily average. Panel A reports the average cumulative abnormal returns across deals between deals at low intensity days and deals at high intensity days. For each deal, CAR(-1,1), CAR(-2,2) and CAR (-3,3 ) is the simple average cumulative abnormal return of the participating firms around t=0, over the event window [-1,1], [-2,2] and [-3,3] , respectively. Panel B reports the impact of news intensity on alliance-based return. Each month, stocks are independently sorted on partners' past return into quintiles, and sorted on the average news intensity (or adjusted news intensity) into two groups. For each firm per month, the raw news intensity is the deal-level news intensity averaged across deals for each firmpartner link, and further averaged across partners. The adjusted news intensity is the cross-sectional regression residual after controlling for size, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, stock price, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage. Stocks with price less than $1 at portfolio formation are excluded. The return testing period is from January 1991 to December 2012. To adjust for serial correlation, robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
